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 Trial TacTics
One of the well-established principles relat-ing to grand juries is that they have the right to investigate any criminal activity that is or 
might be ongoing in their respective jurisdictions and 
to determine how much evidence to seek in the course 
of an investigation. They do not need reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause to call witnesses to testify 
nor to subpoena documents. As long as testimony or 
documents reasonably might be relevant to an inves-
tigation, the grand jury can seek to obtain evidence.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit wrote in In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mr. S.), 
662 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2011), “[i]t is an ancient plat-
itude that a grand jury has a right to every man’s 
evidence.” But that court also recognized that there 
are limits, and one is that a valid claim of privilege 
can trump a grand jury subpoena and cause a court 
to quash the subpoena. Two common privilege claims 
are attorney-client and self-incrimination, both of 
which were at issue in Mr. S.
The Facts of Mr. S.
Mr. S. and attorney Doe (pseudonyms used by the court 
to protect grand jury secrecy) were client and lawyer. 
Mr. S. claimed that Doe is licensed to practice law and 
presents himself as having special expertise in real estate 
transactions and that Mr. S. sought Doe’s assistance in 
connection with a particular real estate transaction that 
became the focus of a grand jury subpoena.
Doe received a federal grand jury subpoena seeking:
Any and all records relating to the purchase 
of real property by [Mr. S.] from [Mr. and 
Mrs. X] on November 20, 2007, that was 
facilitated by [Attorney Doe’s Law Office 
and Title Company], including, but not lim-
ited to, real estate HUD statements, closing 
statement, sales contract(s) and record of 
payment, particularly the source and type 
of funds used (cash, personal check, bank 
checks, etc.) to purchase the property by 
[Mr. S.] and/or any other person.
(Id. at 68 (alterations in original).)
Upon receipt of the subpoena, Doe contacted Mr. 
S. to ask if Mr. S. had an objection to the subpoena. 
Mr. S. gave verbal consent, and Doe complied with the 
subpoena and delivered the documents to the grand 
jury. Within days, though, Mr. S. had second thoughts 
and retained separate counsel, who notified the US 
attorney’s office that the documents were privileged. 
The documents had been examined by a government 
paralegal, but the US attorney’s office put them under 
seal while the privilege claim was litigated.
Mr. S. filed a motion to quash the subpoena and 
raised two privilege claims. His principal claim was 
that the subpoenaed documents were protected by 
the attorney-client privilege. Mr. S. argued that he 
sought Doe’s legal services, as a licensed attorney 
with a real estate specialty, in connection with the 
real estate transaction identified in the subpoena, 
and that Doe represented him in that transaction, 
billed him for services rendered, and used his client 
trust account in the course of the representation. 
To make clear that he believed Doe was performing 
legal services, Mr. S. noted that Doe employed the 
term “Esquire” in the documents and correspon-
dence that he signed.
Mr. S.’s backup claim was that the documents 
were protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination because his act of  pro-
ducing the documents would have been testimonial 
and covered by the privilege had he been served with 
the subpoena and been in possession of the docu-
ments. He relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), for 
the proposition that his attorney cannot be com-
pelled to produce documents that Mr. S. could not 
have been compelled to produce.
A magistrate judge examined the documents in 
camera and rejected the privilege claims, finding 
that nothing in the documents reflected that Mr. 
S. sought or was provided legal advice. The judge 
also found that the documents “lack a confiden-
tial nature,” and denied the motion to quash. (Mr. 
S., 662 F.3d at 68.) The court of appeals affirmed.
attorney-client Privilege
Mr. S.’s first argument was that the magistrate judge 
erred in examining the documents in camera. He 
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
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States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), where the Court 
held that when a party claims the crime-fraud excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege, the party must 
demonstrate some evidence to support the claim 
before a judge may examine the documents in cam-
era. The First Circuit reasoned that it is not necessary 
to resort to the exception until the privilege itself has 
attached, and the privilege does not attach until the 
party claiming it makes a proper showing—which 
did not occur in this case. The court added that “the 
very purpose of conducting an in camera review is to 
determine which, if any, of a group of documents are 
privileged”; “[g]iven this prudential purpose, in cam-
era reviews should be encouraged, not discouraged”; 
and “[w]hen, as in this case, the assertion of privilege 
is subject to legitimate dispute, the desirability of in 
camera review is heightened.” (Mr. S., 662 F.3d at 70.)
Mr. S. also argued that the magistrate judge 
required him to prove entitlement to claim privi-
lege by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas 
he should only have been required to make a prima 
facie showing of privilege. Despite the fact that dis-
puted issues relating to admissibility are ordinarily 
determined by a preponderance standard under 
rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), the 
court of appeals avoided prescribing the standard 
that a judge must use in deciding privilege claims. 
Instead, the court wrote:
It is clear beyond hope of contradiction 
that the party seeking to invoke the attor-
ney-client privilege must carry the devoir of 
persuasion to show that it applies to a par-
ticular communication and has not been 
waived. Whatever quantum of proof is nec-
essary to satisfy this obligation, a blanket 
assertion of privilege is generally insuffi-
cient. Determining whether documents are 
privileged demands a highly fact-specific 
analysis—one that most often requires the 
party seeking to validate a claim of privilege 
to do so document by document.
(Id. at 71 (citations omitted).)
In the end, the court agreed with the magistrate 
judge that Mr. S.’s blanket claim of privilege failed to 
demonstrate entitlement to attorney-client privilege. 
The court reasoned that “Mr. S.’s assertion of privi-
lege is especially weak because the documents listed in 
the subpoena—HUD statements, closing statement, 
sales contract(s) and records of payment indicating the 
source and type of funds used—would all have been 
revealed at the closing and are, therefore, not confi-
dential in nature.” (Id. at 71–72.) Thus, there was no 
expectation that these documents were confidential.
Moreover, the court expressed doubts that 
Doe actually provided legal advice. It wrote the 
following: “Not every piece of an attorney’s work 
product falls within the attorney-client privilege. 
Where, for example, an attorney acts merely as a 
scrivener—facilitating the consummation of a real 
estate transaction, passing title, and disbursing 
funds—the documents generated by those actions 
are typically not privileged.” (Id. at 72.) The court 
concluded that Mr. S. failed to show that Doe was 
more than a scrivener and disburser of funds in con-
nection with the real estate transaction.
Privilege against self-incrimination
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher recognized 
three concepts. First, people can incriminate them-
selves by responding to a subpoena. If, for example, 
a subpoena is issued to X to produce the knife X 
used to stab Y, production of the knife by X would 
be tantamount to stating “this is the knife I used to 
stab Y.” In this example, X would be able to quash 
the subpoena. Second, not all acts of  production 
are incriminating. In Fisher, the government sought 
documents prepared by accountants and provided to 
lawyers by their taxpayer-clients, and the taxpayers 
were unable to make a showing that, had they pos-
sessed the documents and turned them over, they 
would have done anything incriminating. Third, the 
Court held that if  the taxpayers would have poten-
tially incriminated themselves had they received 
subpoenas and turned over the documents, the 
attorney-client privilege could be invoked to prevent 
their attorneys from being compelled to produce the 
documents. To use the previous example, if  X had 
turned over a knife to his attorney (ignore for now 
whether this is permissible) and the attorney had 
received a subpoena to “produce the knife X used 
to stab Y,” X would be able to claim attorney-client 
privilege and quash the subpoena because the attor-
ney could only respond to the subpoena based on 
what X said in confidence; production would, there-
fore, reveal a privileged communication.
With this background, the court of appeals rea-
soned as follows:
To begin, the record does not indicate that 
Mr. S. transferred any preexisting documents 
to Doe. Based on the assertions made in Mr. 
S.’s motion papers, he approached Doe to 
complete a discrete real estate transaction. 
For aught that appears, Doe himself prepared 
the standard documents needed to consum-
mate the transaction, handled the closing, 
disbursed the funds, and retained copies of 
the documents and payment records.
(Mr. S., 662 F.3d at 73.)
Thus, it seems that Mr. S. failed to show that, if  he 
personally had the documents and was subpoenaed, 
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his production could have been incriminating, given 
that he had no apparent role in their preparation.
The court added that
[u]ltimately, though, determining whether 
the subpoenaed documents are preexisting 
or not is of no moment. Either way, there 
is no showing that they are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege because, for reasons 
already explained, Mr. S. failed to establish 
that any documents were tendered to Doe 
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
(Id. at 73–74.)
In other words, the court interpreted Fisher as only 
applying when a client seeks legal advice from a law-
yer concerning documents that the client transfers 
to the lawyer.
lessons
1. Grand juries have broad subpoena power and 
can issue subpoenas to clients, lawyers, or both. The 
subpoenas need not be based on reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause.
2. A valid claim of privilege can trump a grand 
jury subpoena and result in its being quashed, but the 
burden is on the person claiming privilege to demon-
strate entitlement. Although the First Circuit did not 
finally determine the burden that applies, it is likely to 
be a preponderance of the evidence in most courts.
3. Not all documents that clients give to lawyers 
or that lawyers prepare for clients are privileged. 
Generally speaking, preexisting documents (i.e., 
those that existed before the attorney-client rela-
tionship) are not privileged because they were not 
made as part of  the attorney-client relationship. 
What clients tell their attorney about preexisting 
documents will be privileged, as long as the clients 
are seeking legal advice.
4. A lawyer who acts as a mere scrivener or a 
disburser of money may not be deemed to be pro-
viding legal advice, and the privilege may not attach 
to documents prepared by a scrivener or that simply 
reflect a disbursement.
5. A person may validly claim a privilege against 
self-incrimination when production of a document 
may be tantamount to providing incriminating infor-
mation. As Mr. S. recognized, “[s]uch a case may arise 
when an individual’s compelled production of docu-
ments would amount to a tacit concession that the 
documents exist, are authentic, and are in his custody 
or control.” (Id. at 73.) But, the burden is on a person 
claiming the privilege to show that there is reason to 
believe that production could be incriminating.
6. Finally, clients may object to their lawyers 
responding to subpoenas where production by the 
lawyer would violate the attorney-client privilege 
as Fisher recognized. But to successfully object, 
a client must show that if  the documents were in 
the client’s hands, production in response to a sub-
poena would violate the client’s privilege against 
self-incrimination. n
